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EXPATRIATING TERRORISTS
Peter J. Spiro*
INTRODUCTION
Since September 11, 2001, U.S. lawmakers have aggressively sought to
outdo each other in looking tough on terror. Members of Congress have
purported to limit the president’s capacity to shut down Guantánamo,1 have
looked to limit the application of Miranda rights to terror suspects,2 and
have authorized the indefinite detention of those deemed enemy
belligerents.3 Congress’s overall stance on counterterrorism has been more
aggressive than either the courts or the executive branch; in important
respects, it has been an obstacle in efforts to ramp down the war on terror.4
There have been few episodes in which Congress has resisted counterterror
initiatives.
Notable among exceptions are proposals to strip terrorists of their U.S.
citizenship. The bipartisan rejection of such proposals presents a puzzle.
Insofar as citizenship has historically been associated with loyalty, it would
seem a costless, expressive remedy to terminate the citizenship of those
who lend support to hostile entities. This would seem even more the
* Charles Weiner Chair in Law, Temple University Beasley School of Law. This Article
was prepared for the Citizenship, Immigration, and National Security After 9/11 Symposium,
held at Fordham University School of Law on September 20, 2013. Thanks also to
participants in international law colloquia at St. John’s University and Arizona State
University for comments on earlier drafts.
1. See, e.g., National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No. 11281, § 1027, 125 Stat. 1298, 1308 (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 801 note (2012)); MICHAEL JOHN
GARCIA ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40139, CLOSING THE GUANTANAMO DETENTION
CENTER: LEGAL ISSUES 5 (2013) (concluding that congressional constraints on the transfer of
Guantánamo detainees “seem to ensure that the Guantanamo detention facility remains open
for the foreseeable future”).
2. See, e.g., Republican Lawmakers Urge Obama To Use ‘Combatant Status” for
Bombing Suspect, FOXNEWS.COM (Apr. 20, 2013), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2013/
04/20/capitol-hill-republicans-want-combatant-status-for-bombing-suspect-obama-yet-to/
(reporting congressional calls to limit rights extended to Boston Marathon bomber Dzhokhar
Tsarnaev).
3. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 § 1022, 125 Stat. at 1563–
64 (mandating the detention, in military custody, of enemy combatants).
4. See, e.g., Spencer Ackerman, Osama’s Dead, but Congress Wants a Wider War on
Terror, WIRED (May 10, 2011, 11:56 AM), http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2011/05/
osamas-dead-but-congress-wants-a-wider-war/; David Cole, It’s Congress’ Fault That It’s
Still Open, N.Y. TIMES, (Feb. 5, 2013, 5:09 PM), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/
2012/01/09/guantanamo-10-years-later/its-congress-fault-that-guantanamo-is-still-open;
Patricia Zengerle & Matt Spetalnick, Obama Wants To End ‘War on Terror’ but Congress
Balks, REUTERS (May 24, 2013, 2:34 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/24/ususa-obama-speech-idUSBRE94M04Y20130524.
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expected response in the context of individuals who, through race and
religion, seem alien relative to the dominant culture. Other nations,
including the United Kingdom, have adopted legislative measures allowing
for expatriation in the terrorism context.5 And yet, high-profile efforts to
legislate the termination of citizenship in the context of terrorist activities
have fallen flat in the United States. There is little chance that these
proposals will be resurrected. Expatriation of terrorists is unlikely to ever
comprise a component of the U.S. counterterror response.
This Article seeks to explain the rejection of a terrorism ground for
terminating U.S. citizenship.
The Article first establishes the
constitutionality of proposals, focusing on Senator Joseph Lieberman’s
2010 Terrorist Expatriation Act,6 which would have used association with
foreign terrorist groups to evidence an individual’s intent to relinquish
citizenship. The bill’s constitutionality might deepen the puzzle of its
rejection. But conforming such measures to the U.S. Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence on the question limits their utility. Lieberman’s proposal
could be put to work in a very small number of cases; expatriation would be
clear-cut only where terrorist activity were coupled with unambiguous
expressions of individual intent. In other cases, government efforts to
terminate citizenship would prompt litigation on the question, hardly a
welcome prospect in the face of the other various uncertainties and missteps
that have plagued the War on Terror in the courts. It is not clear, moreover,
how expatriation would advance the counterterror agenda.
Few
counterterror tactics account for citizenship. Citizenship no longer buys
individuals much protection; citizens, relative to noncitizens, enjoy few
additional rights.
Where the expatriation proposal lacked instrumental advantage, it may
nonetheless have had expressive value. Even if there was no concrete
payoff, one might have expected the expatriation of alleged terrorists to
have symbolic appeal, especially to politicians otherwise intent on
appearing tough on terror. And yet the likes of then house minority leader
John Boehner and Senator Lindsey Graham desisted. Although sloppy
drafting and a poor rollout for the bill may have contributed to its rejection,
the response may also have been grounded in a robust conception of
citizenship, under which citizenship is seen as sacrosanct, perhaps even
more precious than life itself. This view, which enjoys strong Warren
Court roots, argues against deprivation of citizenship except under the most
stringent constraints. But those who hold this position (largely though not
exclusively Republican) also tend to be counterterror maximalists, favoring
muscular counterterror policies that leave little room for rights, regardless
5. See Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act, 2006, c. 13 (U.K.), available at
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2006/13/pdfs/ukpga_20060013_en.pdf (enabling the
deprivation of citizenship upon a determination that the deprivation is “conducive to the
public good”); Matthew J. Gibney, ‘A Very Transcendental Power’: Denaturalisation and
the Liberalisation of Citizenship in the United Kingdom, Should Citizenship Be
Conditional?, 61 POL. STUD. 637 (2013).
6. Terrorist Expatriation Act, S. 3327, 111th Cong. (2010).
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of citizenship. The sanctified view of citizenship is more nostalgic and
reflexive than substantial—in other words, cheap talk. Citizenship agonists
seemed in the end to shrug off the Lieberman proposal as much as anyone
else.
Either way, the failure of terrorist expatriation proposals will reinforce
the dwindling citizenship differential. As those hostile to the United States
retain their citizenship, citizenship will no longer demarcate the boundary
between friends and enemies. Formal membership is degraded as a proxy
for social membership, which is itself no longer amenable to demarcation.
That perhaps best explains why expatriation no longer has a place in the
context of hostilities. It is no longer clear who the other is. It is no longer a
manageable undertaking to expel those otherwise outside the fold.
Expatriation supplies another optic on the changed nature of global conflict
and human association.
I. EXPATRIATION: A SHORT HISTORY
Capturing a news cycle’s worth of attention in May 2010,7 Joe
Lieberman’s “Terrorist Expatriation Act” would have amended the
Nationality Act to add a new ground for loss of citizenship for engaging in
hostilities against the United States or providing material support to a
foreign terrorist organization.8 The measure was framed as “an update” to
the nationality regime enacted in an era of largely interstate conflict. The
amendment would also have been consistent with Supreme Court rulings
relating to the termination of citizenship. Those rulings have set a high bar
to termination of citizenship without an individual’s cooperation. If
enacted, the new ground of expatriation would have applied in very few
cases. Attempts to secure expatriation in cases of terrorism would have
sparked litigation parallel to litigation implicating more important remedies,
none of which have been substantially obstructed by the maintenance of
U.S. citizenship. In other words, it would hardly have been worth the
trouble for the government to seek termination of citizenship under the Act.
Expatriation has a fascinating part in the history of U.S. nationality.9 It
was first put to work, through administrative practice, in the context of
immigrants to the United States who returned to their countries of origin
after naturalization as Americans.10 Bilateral conflict resulted when these
individuals attempted to use their U.S. citizenship as a shield against the

7. See, e.g., Charlie Savage, Bill Targets Citizenship of Terrorists’ Allies, N.Y. TIMES,
May 7, 2010, at A12.
8. See S. 3327. An identical version of the bill was introduced in the House of
Representatives by Representative Charlie Dent. See Terrorist Expatriation Act, H.R. 5237,
111th Cong. (2010).
9. See, e.g., I-MEIN TSIANG, THE QUESTION OF EXPATRIATION IN AMERICA PRIOR TO
1907 (1942); Richard W. Flournoy, Jr., Naturalization and Expatriation, 31 YALE L.J. 848
(1921); John P. Roche, The Loss of American Nationality—The Development of Statutory
Expatriation, 99 U. PA. L. REV. 25 (1950).
10. See Peter J. Spiro, Dual Nationality and the Meaning of Citizenship, 46 EMORY L.J.
1411, 1442 (1997).
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depredations of European sovereigns.11 In cases in which individuals had
permanently returned to their homelands, U.S. authorities often denied
eligibility for diplomatic protection—in effect, denying the validity of their
citizenship.12 This practice was codified in the Expatriation Act of 1907.13
The 1907 Act also provided for the loss of citizenship where an individual
swore allegiance to a foreign sovereign. The Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of the expatriation regime in its 1915 decision Mackenzie
v. Hare, which considered a woman’s loss of citizenship upon marriage to a
noncitizen.14 The Court reasoned that because the act of marriage was
voluntarily undertaken, the loss of citizenship was itself also volitional.
Service in a foreign armed force was specified as a ground for
expatriation under the Nationality Act of 1940, which significantly
expanded the scope of expatriation.15 It was under the 1940 Act that many
thousands of U.S. citizens who enlisted in the armed forces of Axis states
lost their nationality. The termination of citizenship was automatic; that is,
the act of enlistment by itself made termination effective.16 Loss of
citizenship was challenged in a slew of cases following the war on the
grounds that enlistment had occurred under duress (rendering the
underlying expatriating act involuntary).17 Otherwise, individuals benefited
from the automaticity, insofar as loss of citizenship insulated them from
treason charges and military service obligations.18 In Kawakita v. United
States, the Supreme Court upheld a treason conviction against a Japanese
American dual national only because he had mistreated U.S. prisoners of
war as an employee of a Japanese company and not as a member of the
Japanese armed services.19 As a mere employee, he did not forfeit his U.S.
citizenship and was thus amenable to the treason charge.20 In most cases,
however, expatriation was a fairly straightforward proposition in the
context of a citizen’s service in a foreign fighting force, hostile or
otherwise.
The picture became more complex as the Supreme Court bore down on
the expatriation power in a series of midcentury decisions. The Court
issued a dramatic trio of rulings on a single day in 1958. In Trop v. Dulles,
the Court rejected a punitive use of expatriation; the 1940 law had provided
11. See id.
12. See id.
13. Act of Mar. 2, 1907, Pub. L. No. 59-193, 34 Stat. 1228.
14. Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299 (1915).
15. Nationality Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-853, 54 Stat. 1137.
16. See id. (providing for loss of citizenship for “[e]ntering, or serving in, the armed
forces of a foreign state unless expressly authorized by the laws of the United States, if he
has or acquires the nationality of such foreign state”).
17. See, e.g., Mandoli v. Acheson, 344 U.S. 135 (1952); Note, “Voluntary”: A Concept
in Expatriation, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 932 (1954).
18. Treason itself was added as a ground for expatriation under the 1940 Act. See
Nationality Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-853, § 401(h), 54 Stat. 1137, 1169. The Act was
amended in 1954 to include advocating overthrow of the U.S. government by force. See Act
of Sept. 3, 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-772, 68 Stat. 1146.
19. See Kawakita v. United States, 343 U.S. 717, 720–21, 728, 745 (1952).
20. See Spiro, supra note 10, at 1447 n.157.
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for loss of nationality in cases of desertion.21 In Nishikawa v. Dulles, the
Court required the government to shoulder the burden of proof in
establishing the voluntariness of an expatriating act (in the case, enlistment
in the Japanese armed forces where the individual claimed it to have been
under duress).22 In Perez v. Brownell, meanwhile, the Court upheld
expatriation for voting in a foreign political election.23 Justice William
Douglas described the decisions at the time as “the most important
constitutional pronouncements of this century.”24 The Trop majority
played to rhetorically lofty notes in describing citizenship as more precious
than life itself.25 Even so, the rulings did not significantly crimp the
exercise of the expatriation power in the great majority of cases.
In its 1967 decision Afroyim v. Rusk, the Court pivoted to more muscular
constraint of the power.26 Overruling Perez, Afroyim struck down foreign
voting as an expatriation ground.27 Although Justice Hugo Black’s opinion
appeared categorically to reject a power to terminate citizenship against an
individual’s will,28 the government continued to terminate citizenship
where it deemed expatriating conduct to evince an intent to relinquish
citizenship. Expatriation remained a common practice.29 In Vance v.
Terrazas, the Court acknowledged that conduct other than formal, express
renunciation could result in loss of citizenship, for instance, where an
individual undertook an express oath of renunciation in the course of
naturalizing in another country.30 In 1990, however, the U.S. Department
of State adopted an administrative presumption of nonintent to relinquish
citizenship with respect to statutory grounds of expatriation.31 Under the
current approach, it is impossible to lose one’s citizenship against one’s
will.
Notwithstanding the change in administrative practice, the expatriation
statute itself has remained largely unchanged since 1940. In 1986, section

21.
22.
23.
24.

Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
Nishikawa v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 129 (1958).
Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44 (1958).
See PATRICK WEIL, THE SOVEREIGN CITIZEN: DENATURALIZATION AND THE ORIGINS
OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 147 (2013).
25. See Trop, 356 U.S. at 101 (stating that expatriation is “a form of punishment more
primitive than torture, for it destroys for the individual the political existence that was
centuries in the development”); see also Perez, 356 U.S. at 64 (Warren, C.J., dissenting)
(“Citizenship is man’s basic right for it is nothing less than the right to have rights.”).
26. Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967).
27. Id. at 267–68.
28. See id. at 257 (rejecting the proposition that “Congress has any general power,
express or implied, to take away an American citizen’s citizenship without his assent”).
29. See Peter J. Spiro, Afroyim: Vaunting Citizenship, Presaging Transnationality, in
IMMIGRATION STORIES 147 (David A. Martin ed., 2005) (describing administrative practice
in the aftermath of the Afroyim decision).
30. Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252, 257, 261–63 (1980). In Terrazas, the Court upheld
the expatriation of a citizen who had expressly renounced his U.S. citizenship in applying to
Mexican authorities for a certificate of Mexican nationality. See id. at 255.
31. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, ADVICE ABOUT POSSIBLE LOSS OF U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND
DUAL NATIONALITY, reprinted in State Dept. Explains New Evidentiary Standards for
Expatriation, 67 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1092 (1990).
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349 of the Nationality Act of 1940 was amended to reflect the intent
requirement.32 It still provides for expatriation with respect to foreign
naturalization, for instance, so long as it is associated with intent to
relinquish.33
II. PROVING EXPATRIATING INTENT
The Lieberman measure looked to piggyback on this existing statutory
framework.34 It would have added new grounds of expatriating conduct for
providing material support to designated foreign terrorist organizations,
engaging in or materially supporting hostilities against the United States, or
engaging in or materially supporting hostilities against any country
supporting the United States in hostilities. The Lieberman measure did not
purport to change intent thresholds for loss of citizenship. Under the
amended statute, intent to relinquish citizenship would have remained a
required showing for expatriation. Expatriation would result only where
hostilities against the United States were undertaken with the intent to
relinquish citizenship. Under Nishikawa, the burden of establishing this
intent would rest with the government.35
The Lieberman measure would almost certainly have withstood facial
constitutional attack. The sole plausible challenge would have framed the
added ground as punitive and thus inconsistent with Trop’s bar on punitive
uses of expatriation. The new expatriation grounds would have overlapped
with parallel criminal measures.
Material support for terrorists
(expansively defined) is subject to criminal penalties.36 Undertaking
hostilities against the United States would in many cases qualify as
treason.37 Nonetheless, a strong argument could be made that the new
ground would merely extend the established ground of service in a foreign
armed force engaged in hostilities against the United States.38 That ground
(which originally applied to service in any foreign armed force,39 and still
32. See Act of Nov. 14, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-653, 100 Stat. 3655, 3658.
33. See 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(1) (2012).
34. Lieberman was reported to be “merely suggesting that the U.S. update a decades-old
statute that calls for Americans who join foreign armies fighting the U.S. to lose their
citizenship.” See Ben Frumin, Lieberman on Revoking Terrorists’ Citizenship: ‘American
Citizenship Is a Privilege, Not a Right,’ TPM (May 5, 2010, 9:37 PM),
http://talkingpointsmemo.com/dc/lieberman-on-revoking-terrorists-citizenship-americancitizenship-is-a-privilege-not-a-right-video?ref=fpi; see also Your World with Neil Cavuto
(Fox News broadcast May 5, 2010), available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pfXn_ZIDhY; CongressmanDent, Comments on Enemy Expatriation Act (H.R. 3166), YOUTUBE,
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Hzpr7bL1Iw4 (including comments by Representative
Charlie Dent characterizing the measure as “modernizing” and “updating” existing law).
35. See Nishikawa v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 129, 133 (1958).
36. See 18 U.S.C. § 2339A.
37. Treason has been charged in one post-9/11 case. See infra notes 46–47 (describing
the case of Adam Gadahn).
38. See 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(3).
39. The Expatriation Act of 1907 provided for expatriation where an individual took an
oath of allegiance to a foreign state, which would have included enlistment in foreign armed
forces in many cases. See Act of Mar. 2, 1907, Pub. L. No. 59-193, § 2, 34 Stat. 1228. As a
result, an estimated 15,000 to 20,000 Americans lost their citizenship for enlisting in the
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applies to service in any service as a commissioned or noncommissioned
officer40) is more about transferred allegiance than about criminal activity.
It would thus seem to survive the Trop test. The material support
component of the Lieberman proposal would have been more vulnerable to
constitutional attack, given the breadth of its application in the criminal
context (a breadth upheld by the Supreme Court in Holder v. Humanitarian
Project41). Perhaps for that reason, when Lieberman and co-sponsor
Senator Scott Brown reintroduced the bill in the following session of
Congress in 2012, they omitted the material support ground for
expatriation.42 In its narrowed form, the measure’s constitutionality was
assured.
Perhaps because the Lieberman bill would satisfy constitutional
strictures, it would not have supplied much of a tool. Assuming no change
in current State Department practice, under which there is a presumption
that potentially expatriating conduct did not occur with intent to
relinquish,43 the amendment would have been without effect. But even
assuming that the administrative practice was changed, constitutional
limitations would work to defang it. Under Terrazas, the government
would need to show specific intent to relinquish citizenship.44 Intent is
readily demonstrated only with verbal expressions. The case of Adam
Gadahn is probably the sole notable case in which the Lieberman approach
would have worked to effect loss of citizenship. In the course of an antiAmerican diatribe against the United States, Gadahn (a native-born citizen)
That would presumably suffice to
shredded his U.S. passport.45
demonstrate intent to relinquish.46

Canadian, British, and other allied armed forces prior to the United States’ entry into World
War I, which was later restored to them by statute. See Repatriation Act of Oct. 5, 1917, Pub.
L. No. 65-55, 40 Stat. 340 (providing for restoration of citizenship to persons who had
served in armed forces of countries “engaged in war with a country with which the United
States is at war”); 55 CONG. REC. 7662 (1917) (describing the circumstances leading to the
legislation).
40. See 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(3)(B).
41. 561 U.S. 1 (2010).
42. See S. 1698, 112th Cong. (2011). The reintroduced measure was entitled the
“Enemy Expatriation Act,” perhaps also by way of addressing concerns of the breadth of the
original measure.
43. See supra note 31.
44. See Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252, 259 (1980).
45. See Jeffrey Imm, Al-Qaeda’s Gadahn—Transcript of January 6 Message,
COUNTERTERRORISM BLOG (Jan. 7, 2008, 6:27 PM), http://counterterrorismblog.org/
2008/01/gadahn_010608_transcript.php (transcribing a video showing Gadahn ripping up his
U.S. passport “in symbolic rejection of U.S. citizenship”); American Al Qaeda Member
Renounces U.S. Citizenship, CNN.COM (Jan. 6, 2008), http://www.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/
meast/01/06/gadahn.tape/.
46. Lieberman referred to the Gadahn case in introducing the bill. “If our proposal
becomes law the State Department could immediately begin revoking Gadahn’s citizenship
and that of other American citizens we know are involved in American terrorist
organizations abroad. They could then be tried by military commission.” See Kasie Hunt,
Experts Dismiss Lieberman Terror Bill, POLITICO (May 6, 2010), http://www.politico.com/
news/stories/0510/36896.html; see also Patricia Murphy, Lieberman and Scott Brown Move
To Strip U.S. Citizenship for Terrorists, POL. DAILY (May 6, 2010),
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Otherwise, expatriation would require a fact-based inquiry into intent in
particular cases. That could prove tricky. Engagement in hostilities (much
less material support of foreign terrorist organizations) would not by itself
evidence intent to relinquish citizenship. Short of passport shredding or
equivalent expressions, one could imagine equating the articulation of
unmitigated antagonism to the United States with a desire to shed
citizenship status. The only clear path to loss of citizenship—formal
renunciation before U.S. consular authorities—is not exactly a practical
alternative for those plotting against the United States. As the most
notorious citizen-terrorist, Anwar al-Awlaki presents an interesting test
case. Al-Awlaki was serially involved in various plots to attack the United
States and U.S. entities, but it is unclear whether he intended to relinquish
his citizenship.47
Expatriating terrorists would be anything but straightforward. An earlier
proposal drafted by the U.S. Department of Justice under the Bush
Administration—billed as Patriot II—was leaked, but never introduced as
legislation in Congress. The proposal would have made serving in or
providing material support to a terrorist organization “prima facie evidence
that the act was done with the intention of relinquishing United States
nationality.”48 That would have been more easily satisfied than the
Lieberman threshold, but would have been in tension, at least, with the
Terrazas holding. In either case, efforts to expatriate terrorists would have
promised drawn-out litigation on issues of both law and fact.
III. CITIZENSHIP’S (NON)ADVANTAGE
Compounding the unfavorable jurisprudential backdrop is the lack of a
substantial instrumental advantage in expatriation from the government’s
perspective. Even if there were a clear path to expatriation, the payoff
would be minimal. The citizenship differential, even in the counterterror
context, is dwindling.49
There are three key counterterror dimensions in which citizenship does
make a difference. As a matter of policy, citizens are not detained at
Guantánamo. By statute, citizens cannot be subjected to prosecution before
military commissions. Finally, the targeting of citizens in drone strikes is
subjected to a higher level of scrutiny. These differences do not appear to
significantly enhance the government’s arsenal against particular
http://www.politicsdaily.com/2010/05/06/terror-suspects-would-lose-u-s-citizenship-undersenate-bill/ (suggesting, in reference to Gadahn, that “[i]f somebody wants to set fire to their
passport, let’s help them along”).
47. Cf. H.R. Res. 1288, 111th Cong. (2010) (urging an appropriate diplomatic or
consular official to find that al-Awlaki had voluntarily relinquished his citizenship as a result
of hostile acts against the United States).
48. Domestic Security Enhancement Act of 2003, § 501, available at http://wwwtc.pbs.org/now/politics/patriot2-hi.pdf; see also Joanne Mariner, Patriot II’s Attack on
Citizenship, CNN.COM (Jan. 22, 2004, 2:57 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2003/LAW/03/06/
findlaw.analysis.mariner.patriotII/.
49. See generally Peter J. Spiro, The (Dwindling) Rights and Obligations of Citizenship,
21 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 899 (2013).
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individuals. Guantánamo is a legacy undertaking—no president, Democrat
or Republican, is going to send new detainees to the facility in the face of
growing global and domestic opposition. The military commissions, which
by statute are limited to the prosecution of noncitizens,50 are probably also
an artifact of the Bush Administration’s post-9/11 policy. Although
necessary for the prosecution of Guantánamo detainees, whom Congress
has barred from transfer to the United States,51 the military commissions
present a clearly inferior forum for the prosecution of future terror cases.
As the Obama Administration has highlighted, the federal courts have a
perfect record in convicting terrorists post-9/11 where the military
commissions have been plagued by legal and administrative deficiencies.52
Given the choice on a clean slate (with evidence that has not been tainted by
torture or other constitutional infirmities), military commissions are clearly
inferior to the Southern District of New York as a prosecutorial venue.53
The differential process afforded citizens in targeting decisions is more
salient, perhaps. Although details remain classified, targeting of U.S.
citizens with drones is clearly subject to a higher level of review than the
targeting of noncitizens.54 However, whatever higher level of scrutiny is
extended to citizen targeting, it is less than the scrutiny applied to
expatriation. In other words, it is easier to kill than expatriate. If the
government had sufficient evidence to expatriate an individual, it would
also have sufficient evidence to undertake a drone strike, at least under
existing practice. In most cases, in fact, the government will have a shaky
case for expatriation but an adequate one for targeted killing. In the
50. See 10 U.S.C. § 948c (2012) (stating that military commissions are only applicable
to alien unlawful enemy combatants). There is no constitutional bar to the use of military
commissions against citizens. See Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 37–38 (1942).
51. See Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011, Pub. L.
No. 111-383, § 1032, 124 Stat. 4137 (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 127b). See generally MICHAEL
JOHN GARCIA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40754, GUANTANAMO DETENTION CENTER:
LEGISLATIVE ACTIVITY IN THE 111TH CONGRESS (2011); Recent Legislation, National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, Pub. L. No. 112-239, § 1028, 126 Stat.
1632, 1914–17 (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 801 note (2012)), 127 HARV. L. REV. 835 (2013).
52. See generally JESS BRAVIN, THE TERROR COURTS: ROUGH JUSTICE AT GUANTANAMO
BAY (2013).
53. Lieberman used the availability of military commissions in the prosecution of
noncitizens as a justification for his proposal. See Hunt, supra note 46. In the most recent
case posing the choice between military commission or federal court for the prosecution of
an accused terrorist noncitizen, federal authorities opted for the latter. See Benjamin Weise,
Captured in Libya, 1998 Bombing Suspect Pleads Not Guilty in Manhattan Court, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 16, 2013, at A22 (describing the case of Nazih Abdul-Hamed al-Ruqai).
54. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, LAWFULNESS OF A LETHAL OPERATION DIRECTED
AGAINST A U.S. CITIZEN WHO IS A SENIOR OPERATIONAL LEADER OF AL-QA’IDA OR AN
ASSOCIATED FORCE (2011), available at http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/msnbc/sections/news/
020413_DOJ_White_Paper.pdf; Charlie Savage & Scott Shane, Legal Basis Cited To Kill
Americans in Al Qaeda, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2013, at A6. Citizenship appears salient to
public attitudes on targeted killings. See Aaron Blake, Poll Shows Huge Support for Rand
Paul’s Filibuster Stance on Drones, WASH. POST (Mar. 25, 2013, 9:18 AM),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-politics/wp/2013/03/25/poll-shows-huge-support
-for-rand-pauls-filibuster-stance-on-drone-attacks/ (stating that 65 percent of U.S. adults
support airstrikes against suspected noncitizen terrorists abroad, while only 41 percent
support such strikes against citizens).
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expatriation context, the government would have to take litigation
uncertainty into account, where in the targeting context (at least as of now)
the executive branch makes the call on its own.55 Why look to strip an
alleged terrorist of his citizenship when you can more easily strip him of his
existence? Warren Court rhetoric aside,56 the government would have
reason to prefer a dead citizen terrorist to a live noncitizen one.57
Citizenship, in other words, does not buy you much protection, at least
not if you are a suspected terrorist. In addition to targeted killing without
judicial process, the Bush Administration claimed the constitutional
capacity to detain a citizen without process.58 In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the
Supreme Court sustained the detention of a U.S. citizen apprehended on the
battlefield.59 Although the Court found citizens in Hamdi to enjoy some
level of due process, it did not require the government to prosecute or
release.60 In recent detention-related legislation, Congress failed to deny
the president the power to detain individuals apprehended in the United
States, citizens or not.61 Citizenship does not insulate terror suspects from
surveillance or other investigatory activity. The Boston Marathon bombing
is illustrative: the surviving Tsarnaev brother (a naturalized citizen) was
questioned for sixteen hours without being given Miranda warnings under a
55. See Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 1, 21–22 (D.D.C. 2010) (rejecting a challenge
to kill-list designation on jurisdictional grounds); see also Attorney General Eric Holder,
Address at Northwestern University School of Law (Mar. 5, 2102), available at
http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/ag/speeches/2012/ag-speech-1203051.html (“‘Due process’
and ‘judicial process’ are not one and the same, particularly when it comes to national
security. The Constitution guarantees due process, not judicial process.”).
56. See supra notes 25–28.
57. On the flip side, a terrorist expatriation measure would have little deterrent value.
See Peter H. Schuck, Citizen Terrorist, 164 POL’Y REV. 61, 72 (2010) (“The threat to a
potential terrorist of losing his American citizenship is likely to pale in significance
compared with the other penalties for terrorist acts. If the threats of self-immolation,
criminal prosecution, and capital punishment do not deter him, possible loss of citizenship
will certainly not do so.”).
58. The Second Circuit rejected the government’s power to subject a U.S. citizen to
military detention on U.S. territory. See Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695 (2d Cir. 2003),
vacated on other grounds, 542 U.S. 426 (2004). The Supreme Court vacated that decision
on procedural grounds. See Padilla, 542 U.S. at 427 (rejecting the habeas petition as filed in
the wrong judicial district). The Bush Administration transferred Padilla to the civilian
criminal justice system before the Supreme Court could revisit the case on the merits. See
Eric Lichtblau, In Legal Shift, U.S. Charges Detainee in Terror Case, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23,
2005, at A20.
59. See generally Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
60. Id.; see also id. at 556–58 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
61. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-81,
§ 1021, 125 Stat. 1298 (2011). In his signing statement, President Barack Obama sought “to
clarify that [his] Administration will not authorize the indefinite military detention without
trial of American citizens.” Press Release, White House, Statement by the President on H.R.
1540 (Dec. 31, 2011), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/12/31/
statement-president-hr-1540. President Obama also undertook to limit the military detention
of noncitizens to a limited class of “covered persons,” waiving the National Defense
Authorization Act’s military detention requirement with respect to broad categories of
noncitizens. Id. An effort to amend the statute the following year to bar the military
detention of citizens and permanent residents apprehended in the United States passed the
Senate but failed in the House. See S. 3254, 112th Cong. (2012).
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public safety exception applicable regardless of location and citizenship
status.62 As a practical matter, citizenship may not even guarantee entry
into the United States, as citizens placed on watchlists have discovered.63
At the same time that citizenship protections have been diluted,
protections for noncitizens have been elevated. Terror suspects held at
Guantánamo have been extended habeas privileges.64 Lower courts have
extended Fifth Amendment rights to noncitizen terror suspects in criminal
investigations outside the United States.65 Though the Supreme Court
found that noncitizens outside of the United States do not enjoy Fourth
Amendment protections in its pre-9/11 decision United States v. VerdugoUrquidez,66 there may be equivalent protections under foreign law and
emerging ones under international law.67 International human rights norms
62. See Charlie Savage, Debate Over Delaying of Miranda Warning, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 20, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/21/us/a-debate-over-delaying-suspectsmiranda-rights.html; see also Joanna Wright, Mirandizing Terrorists? An Empirical
Analysis of the Public Safety Exception, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1296 (2011); Charlie Savage,
Developments Rekindle Debate Over Best Approach for Terrorism Suspects, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 14, 2011, at A14.
63. See, e.g., JEFFREY KAHN, MRS. SHIPLEY’S GHOST: THE RIGHT TO TRAVEL AND
TERRORIST WATCHLISTS 171–72 (2013); Leti Volpp, Citizenship Undone, 75 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2579, 2579 (2007). Expatriation would thus add little to the counterterror toolbox in
terms of nullifying the possible advantages of citizenship with respect to enabling terrorist
activity. Citizenship legally guarantees unfettered access to the United States, which could
facilitate the planning of a terrorist attack. Preemptively depriving an individual of
citizenship thus might contribute to counterterrorism efforts. However, the government
would need to already possess evidence of terrorist activity in order to undertake
expatriation, at which point citizenship itself would be of little value to the would-be terrorist
insofar as he would be subject to surveillance and other enforcement activity, including
placement on no-fly lists. If the standard for expatriation were lower, it might comprise a
more useful counterterror policy. See Shai Lavi, Punishment and Revocation of Citizenship
in the United Kingdom, United States, and Israel, 13 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 404, 409–13 (2010)
(observing that British law allowing expatriation where “conducive to the public good”
might serve proactive security interests). Similar to the placement of citizens on no-fly lists
is the practice of confiscating the passports of U.S. citizens abroad, as documented elsewhere
in this symposium. See Ramzi Kassem, Passport Revocation As Proxy Denaturalization:
Examining the Yemen Cases, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 2097 (2014) (documenting the irregular
confiscation of passports of U.S. citizens resident in Yemen); see also Amel Ahmed,
Yemeni-Americans Cry Foul over Revocations, ALJAZEERA AM. (Jan. 21, 2014, 5:00 PM),
http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014/1/21/yemeni-americanscryfouloverpassportrevoca
tions.html.
64. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
65. See United States v. Bin Laden, 132 F. Supp. 2d 168, 173 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)
(extending Fifth Amendment protection to a detainee held in Kenya).
66. 494 U.S. 259 (1990).
67. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 17, Dec. 16, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 177 (“No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his
privacy, family, home or correspondence . . . .”). The recent controversy over U.S.
government surveillance is more firmly fueling efforts to establish privacy rights under
international law. See, e.g., David Cole, We Are All Foreigners: NSA Spying and the Rights
of Others, JUST SECURITY (Oct. 29, 2013), http://justsecurity.org/2013/10/29/foreigners-nsaspying-rights/; see also LIBERTY AND SECURITY IN A CHANGING WORLD: REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE PRESIDENT’S REVIEW GROUP ON INTELLIGENCE AND
COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGIES 155–56 (2013), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
sites/default/files/docs/2013-12-12_rg_final_report.pdf (situating NSA surveillance issues in
a human rights frame).
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have gone a long way to undermining Hannah Arendt’s pronouncement that
“all rights are national rights.”68
No doubt there are situations in which U.S. citizenship status represents
an advantage to the individual that holds it. The government would not
hold a known citizen at Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan on an indefinite
basis, for example.69 But for purposes of the expatriation question, the
baseline would be an individual whom the government already can show,
shouldering the burden of proof, is associated with a hostile force. In
almost all cases, that baseline would supply probable cause for suspecting
criminal activity, in which citizen and noncitizen alike are almost equally
exposed to government enforcement activity. The question is not to what
extent citizenship insulates individuals from official depredations; it is
rather what the government has to gain from stripping an individual of
citizenship and what it will take to do the stripping. Given the proverbial
exertion and uncertainties involved in reviving a process that has all but
descended into desuetude, it is not worth the effort.
Under this instrumentalist explanation, it is easy to see why the
Lieberman proposal was shrugged off.
The exercise was one in
counterterror showboating on the part of Lieberman and his cosponsors.
The Lieberman proposal attracted some media attention, especially on the
coattails of the attempted 2010 Times Square bombing, yet it did not garner
so much as a committee hearing. When the measure was reintroduced in
the following Congress (again, with Lieberman and Scott Brown as
cosponsors),70 it attracted no attention at all.
IV. COUNTERTERROR CULTURES OF CITIZENSHIP
Some legal commentators recognized the nonconsequence of the
Lieberman initiative.71 But the proposal’s lack of consequence only partly
explains its rejection. It is unlikely that most politicians had situated the
proposal against an obscure constitutional backdrop. One might have
expected the proposal to have expressive value even if it had no concrete
effect, especially among those who have revived a loyalty discourse in the

68. HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM 267 (2d ed. 1973).
69. See Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3d 84, 99 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (finding habeas not to
extend to a detainee held in military custody in Afghanistan).
70. See supra note 42.
71. Schuck, supra note 57 (stating that expatriation is not “an effective weapon” against
terrorists); David Cole, Bill To Expatriate Those Who Support Terrorists More Symbol Than
Substance, WASH. POST, May 8, 2010, at A13; Erwin Chemerinsky, Even Terrorism
Suspects Have Rights, L.A. TIMES (May 11, 2010), http://articles.latimes.com/
2010/may/11/opinion/la-oe-0511-chemerinsky-20100511. There were also proceduralist
attacks on the proposal. See, e.g., Jonathan Turley, Lieberman Unveils Citizenship Stripping
Bill, JONATHAN TURLEY (May 6, 2010), http://jonathanturley.org/2010/05/06/liebermanunveils-citizenship-stripping-bill/. For the (mostly) supportive view of a prominent
conservative academic, see Richard Epstein, Terrorism and Citizenship, FORBES (May
18, 2010),
http://www.forbes.com/2010/05/18/terrorism-citizenship-constitution-politicsopinions-columnists-richard-a-epstein.html.
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wake of 9/11.72 The response seemed more reflexive than considered.
Some worked from a robust conception of citizenship and its constitutional
stature in rejecting the measure. Others seemed unimpressed, in a way that
evinced an attenuated understanding of the status, one buttressed by its
diminishing consequence even in the context of counterterrorism. That
perhaps ultimately explains why expatriation proposals have had no legs.
Citizenship has historically been framed in terms of loyalty and
allegiance.73 It has set down the legal boundaries of human community—
the marker between “us” and “them.”74 Beyond its legal benefits, it has
been processed as a signifier of membership, reflecting communal
solidarities, vaunted as a kind of badge of honor. In the terror context,
which of course has been situated as “war,”75 hostile forces have been
labeled as “enemies” (legally76 and colloquially) and “the other.”77 It is
thus surprising that legislative counterterror warriors would hesitate to use
expatriation as a mechanism for outcasting those who have shown loyalty to
terrorist adversaries. Expatriation would have expected expressive value in
consolidating communal solidarities by reinforcing the line between
member and nonmember.78 Even if the courts obstructed its deployment in
particular cases, legislators would garner returns through the enactment of a
terrorist expatriation measure.79 Along these lines, the “spirit” of the
Lieberman proposal was welcomed from some unexpected quarters.80

72. See, e.g., Geoffrey R. Stone, Free Speech in the Age of McCarthy: A Cautionary
Tale, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 1387 (2005).
73. See, e.g., CRAIG ROBERSTON, THE PASSPORT IN AMERICA: THE HISTORY OF A
DOCUMENT 151 (2010). The current naturalization oath perpetuates this framing by
requiring new citizens to “renounce and abjure all allegiance and fidelity” to foreign
sovereigns while having them “bear true faith and allegiance” to the United States. See
8 C.F.R. § 337.1 (2014) (setting forth the oath of naturalization).
74. See, e.g., Leti Volpp, The Citizen and the Terrorist, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1575 (2002).
75. On the nomenclature of the response to the 9/11 attacks, see, for example, Is It
War?, WASH. POST (Dec. 23, 2007), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/2007/12/22/AR2007122201492.html, and Philip Bobbitt, ‘Terror’ Is the Enemy, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 14, 2008, at WK10.
76. Alleged terrorists are designated as “enemy combatants” for purposes of taking them
out of the civilian justice system. When Senator Lieberman reintroduced his measure in
2011, the title was changed from “Terrorist Expatriation Act” to “Enemy Expatriation Act.”
See supra note 42.
77. See, e.g., Riva Kastoryano, Codes of Otherness, 77 SOC. RES. 79, 79 (2010).
78. Cf. Lavi, supra, note 63, at 425 (“Citizenship may be revoked if and only if such
revocation simultaneously strengthens the civic bond of the community . . . .”); Schuck,
supra note 57 (suggesting that stripping terrorists of citizenship would be “morally just and
emotionally satisfying”).
79. See Threat To Strip Citizenship Won’t Dissuade Terrorists, BOS. GLOBE (May 8,
2010), http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/editorial_opinion/editorials/articles/2010/05/08/
threat_to_strip_citizenship_wont_dissuade_terrorists/ (“Given that this bill is probably
unconstitutional and not any sort of real deterrent, it seems designed as a vehicle for
expressing political anger over terrorism.”). Several commentators predicted that the
proposal would secure popular support. See, e.g., Interview by Jennifer Scholtes with Peter
H. Schuck, Professor, Yale Law School (Jan. 11, 2011), available at
http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/News_&_Events/CitizenTerrorist.pdf
(including
Peter Schuck’s observation that the public would accept expatriation measure); Paul
Waldman, Citizen Ex, AM. PROSPECT (May 11, 2010), http://prospect.org/article/citizen-ex-0
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Moreover, adopting a terrorist expatriation measure would have been in
line with the practice of other states. Most notably, the United Kingdom
has pursued expatriation against alleged terrorists under a 2003 statute that
allows the termination of citizenship where it serves the public interest. It
has reportedly undertaken denationalization by way of facilitating U.S.
drone strikes against (former) British citizens.81 The British counterparts to
al-Awlaki, in other words, have been stripped of their citizenship before
targeting proceeds. Similar security-related expatriation statutes are on the
books in other countries.82 The expatriation question may supply an
example of a phenomenon described by Kim Lane Scheppele, in which
international counterterror norms expand rather than constrain state power
(more particularly, executive power).83 Though Congress is hardly known
to follow international leads, it adds incrementally to the puzzle. If states
such as the United Kingdom have adopted terrorist expatriation measures,
one might expect the United States to take the cue.
Congressional rejection of the expatriation measure thus requires
explanation beyond its expected lack of efficacy as a counterterror tool.

(“Though no one has done a poll on the Lieberman proposal yet, it’s a good bet that a
majority of the public would be in favor of stripping citizenship from ‘bad guys.’”). It would
not be the first time that Congress took action that it could assume would be subsequently
blocked in the courts. See, e.g., MARK C. MILLER, THE VIEW OF THE COURTS FROM THE HILL:
INTERACTIONS BETWEEN CONGRESS AND THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 102–03 (2009) (describing
the enactment of clearly unconstitutional laws). Those cases almost always involve
expressive value by way of Congress taking a stand against what it believes to be an
incorrect interpretation of the law. See Jacob E. Gersen & Eric A. Posner, Soft Law: Lessons
from Congressional Practice, 61 STAN. L. REV. 573, 585–86 (2008).
80. See Savage, supra note 7 (reporting the qualified positive responses to the
Lieberman measure from House Speaker Nancy Pelosi and Secretary of State Hillary
Clinton).
81. See Chris Woods et al., British Terror Suspects Quietly Stripped of Citizenship . . .
Then Killed by Drones, INDEPENDENT (Feb. 28, 2013), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/
uk/crime/british-terror-suspects-quietly-stripped-of-citizenship-then-killed-by-drones8513858.html.
82. See, e.g., Jonathan Lis, Knesset Passes Law To Strip Terrorists of Israeli
Citizenship, HAARETZ (Mar. 28, 2011, 10:50 PM), http://www.haaretz.com/news/national/
knesset-passes-law-to-strip-terrorists-of-israeli-citizenship-1.352412. For a cataloguing of
states that provide for loss of citizenship on the basis of treason or disloyalty, see Comparing
Citizenship Laws: Loss of Citizenship, EUR. U. INST., http://eudo-citizenship.eu/globalmodes-of-loss (last visited Mar. 25, 2014) (select “L07 => Disloyalty or treason” under
“Search by Mode”; then follow “Search” hyperlink).
83. See Kim Lane Scheppele, Law in a Time of Emergency: States of Exception and the
Temptations of 9/11, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1001 (2004). This is not to say that terrorist
expatriation measures are unproblematic under international law. To the extent that
expatriation results in statelessness, it may violate a state’s treaty obligations and would in
any case conflict with a norm against statelessness under international law. To avoid this
conflict, the U.K. expatriation measure applies only to dual citizens, that is, persons who will
still have a nationality following termination of U.K. nationality. But that scheme gave rise
to the charge that the measure discriminates against dual citizens. See Rayner Thwaites, The
Security of Citizenship: Finnis in the Context of the United Kingdom’s Citizenship Stripping
Provisions, in ALLEGIANCE AND IDENTITY IN A GLOBALISED WORLD (Fiona Jenkins et al. eds.,
forthcoming 2014); see also Peter J. Spiro, Dual Citizenship As Human Right, 8 INT’L J.
CONST. L. 111 (2010) (arguing that international practice is coming to recognize a right to
maintain dual citizenship status).
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Some lawmakers and commentators responded with apparent
noncomprehension. As John Boehner remarked, “If they’re a U.S. citizen,
until they’re convicted of some crime, I don’t know how you would attempt
to take their citizenship away.”84 The prospect of depriving someone of
citizenship seemed to strike a deep chord with some. Although it was not
well articulated, this response was in the tradition of the Warren Court
expatriation decisions, conceiving of citizenship as constitutive of political
existence, the right to have rights, its loss akin to political death.85 The
sentiment may have undergirded snap editorial judgments of the measure’s
unconstitutionality.86 This view echoes the status essentialism of Justice
Antonin Scalia’s dissent in Hamdi. Scalia, otherwise hardly solicitous of
the rights of alleged enemy combatants, drew a sharp line at the boundaries
of citizenship, with full rights attendant to the status.87 But Scalia’s
position was set forth in dissent, as the Court found the detention outside
ordinary criminal justice to have been constitutional. A variant of the reflex
opposition to the expatriation proposal may also have worked from antigovernment impulses. Conservative former congressman Bob Barr, for
example, argued that native-born Americans could be stripped of the
“fundamental right” of citizenship “by a government bureaucrat without
ever having had their day in court.”88
84. See Hunt, supra note 46.
85. See, e.g., Threats To Strip Citizenship Are Un-American, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH,
(May 11, 2010, 9:00 PM), http://www.stltoday.com/news/opinion/columns/the-platform/
threats-to-strip-citizenship-are-un-american/article_a11c345c-0289-5295-bf6d-4100b66ca9c
b.html (“Citizenship is not a license that expires upon misbehavior . . . .” (quoting Trop v.
Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 92 (1958))).
86. See, e.g., Threat To Strip Citizenship Won’t Dissuade Terrorists, supra note 79
(characterizing the bill as “probably unconstitutional”). Lieberman was slow to defend the
measure’s constitutionality, for instance, against charges that it would violate due process.
The timing of the proposal may also have contributed to its demise; the Times Square
bombing case, involving a naturalized citizen residing in the United States, may not have
resonated in the same way that one involving an alleged terrorist holed up in the Near East
might have. Finally, Lieberman’s association with the bill could not have been an asset,
given his status at the time as an Independent who had angered Democratic loyalists at the
same time that he was regarded with suspicion by the Republican rank-and-file. See, e.g.,
Charles Mahtesian, The Trouble with Joe Lieberman, POLITICO (Jan. 11, 2011, 7:54 PM),
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0111/47858.html (noting Lieberman’s “near-pariah
status”). However, the inclusion of a similar expatriation measure in the failed 2005 draft
Patriot II legislation would appear to control for the last two factors. See supra note 49.
87. Although citizenship status was not itself at issue in Hamdi, Scalia did not take the
bait of an amicus arguing that Hamdi did not have citizenship in the first place as the child of
parents residing only temporarily in the United States. See Brief for the Claremont Institute
Center for Constitutional Jurisprudence As Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, Hamdi
v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (No. 03-6696).
88. See Bob Barr, Knee-Jerk “Loss of Citizenship” Bill Is Unconstitutional and
Unnecessary, ATLANTA J.-CONST. (May 21, 2010, 6:00 AM), http://blogs.ajc.com/bob-barrblog/2010/05/21/knee-jerk-loss-of-citizenship-bill-is-unconstitutional-and-unnecessary/.
Bob Barr has been notably outspoken in opposing other counterterror practices from the
right. See, e.g., Defeated G.O.P. Congressman To Be Consultant to A.C.L.U., N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 23, 2002, at A15. Though he was not yet in Congress at the time of the Lieberman
proposal, Senator Rand Paul might also have been expected to oppose the measure given his
opposition to the use of drones against U.S. citizens. See, e.g., Kevin Robillard, Rand Paul
Urges Drone Due Process Fixes, POLITICO (May 26, 2013, 10:33 AM), http://www.politico.
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The other possible explanation is that suspected terrorists do not seem
different enough, from a social-cultural perspective, to warrant the
termination of citizenship. That is, however heinous their actions, citizen
terrorists may be still perceived as being within the membership fold—our
bad guys, not someone else’s. From this perspective, expatriation on
terrorism grounds would not map out onto the social realities of those to
whom it would be applied. In this view, expatriation would look more like
banishment or exile—practices antithetical to American constitutional
culture—rather than a reflection of transferred affiliation.89 This in turn
would diminish the expressive value of terrorist expatriation measures.
Senator Graham opposed the Lieberman measure on the ground that it
would take treason charges off the prosecutorial table, which can only be
lodged against citizen defendants.90
This explanation finds plausible support in a range of post-9/11 terrorism
episodes. John Walker Lindh looked everything like a troubled suburban
teenager who, however far he had wandered from the path, still seemed
“American” notwithstanding his joining Taliban forces in Afghanistan.91
Adam Gadahn was born Adam Pearlman—his father was on the board of
directors of the Anti-Defamation League, and Adam grew up playing Little
League as a boy in California.92 Even Anwar al-Awlaki had some

com/blogs/politico-live/2013/05/paul-drone-program-still-needs-due-process-improvements164799.html. This strain of antigovernmental opposition might also have been sensitive to
the broad framing of the material support element of Lieberman’s original bill, insofar as it
could conceivably have triggered expatriation in cases involving “freedom fighters,” that is,
armed movements opposing repressive regimes, or against domestic terror groups. Cf. In re
S-K-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 936, 945 (B.I.A. 2006) (finding an alien inadmissible to the United
States on the grounds that he provided material support to a group resisting a regime in
Burma that violated human rights).
89. See Matthew J. Gibney, Should Citizenship Be Conditional? The Ethics of
Denationalization, 75 J. POL. 646, 647–48 (2013) (describing the delegitimization of
banishment in the modern liberal state).
90. See Jacob Solum, Terrorists Don’t Deserve Citizenship, HIT & RUN BLOG (May 6,
2010, 11:09 AM), http://reason.com/blog/2010/05/06/lieberman-terrorists-dont-dese.
Treason charges may remain a prosecutorial option, as demonstrated by the Gadahn
indictment. There have, however, been no treason convictions since Kawakita. See, e.g.,
Kristen E. Eichensehr, Treason in the Age of Terrorism: An Explanation and Evaluation of
Treason’s Return in Democratic States, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1443, 1455 (2009).
This may be explained by heightened, express constitutional hurdles to treason convictions.
See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3. Prosecutors have a number of more tried-and-true tools in
cases involving treason-like conduct, including the Espionage Act and various conspiracy
statutes. See, e.g., Indictment, United States v. Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d 541 (E.D. Va. 2002)
(No. Crim. 02-37-A), available at http://www.justice.gov/ag/2ndindictment.htm (charging
Lindh with conspiracy among other charges); Peter Finn & Sari Horwitz, U.S. Charges
Snowden with Espionage, WASH. POST (June 21, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
world/national-security/us-charges-snowden-with-espionage/2013/06/21/507497d8-dab111e2-a016-92547bf094cc_story.html. Unlike expatriation, a treason prosecution would
require that an individual be in custody; expatriation may be effected in absentia.
91. See Evelyn Nieves, A U.S. Convert’s Path from Suburbia to a Gory Jail for Taliban,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2001, at B1.
92. See Peggy Lowe, Radical Conversion: How a Man with O.C. Roots Turned Toward
Al-Qaida, ORANGE CNTY. REG. (Sept. 24, 2006), http://www.ocregister.com/articles/
pearlman-40891-county-orange.html; see also Andrea Elliott, The Jihadist Next Door, N.Y.
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significant U.S. ties. Born in New Mexico and spending his early
childhood in the United States, he returned to the United States to undertake
undergraduate studies at Colorado State University (where he received a
B.S. degree), during which time he fathered a child (who thus, himself, had
U.S. citizenship at birth).93
The explanation is also attractive to the extent it self-situates in a
globalization narrative, in which the lines of national identity have been
scrambled. “Us” and “them” have been destabilized as metatypes in the
face of increasing global mobility. To the extent they persist, terrorism
supplies a particularly poor bulwark. In the past, participation in hostilities
against the United States implicated transfer of loyalty to symmetrical
entities, namely, other states. Loyalty to a terrorist organization, by
contrast, implicates affiliation to a different type of association. Many
terrorists are citizens of states that are allied to the United States. To the
extent that blurred identities were also pervasive in earlier eras, the advent
of conflict involved the choice to put in one’s lot with one of two like
entities.
However congruent this explanation may be with academic
understandings of globalization and citizenship,94 it seems an unlikely optic
through which to understand the rejection of terrorist expatriation measures.
As with many al Qaeda and Taliban leaders, Gadahn and al-Awlaki fit the
stereotypical image of a turban- and robe-garbed, bearded Middle Easterner
cum jihadist, an image that (however false the equivalence, both in general
and in these cases) coincides with American understandings of
“foreignness.” Beyond Gadahn and al-Awlaki, there are other alleged
citizen terrorists who have been more clearly foreign in social membership
terms. Yaser Hamdi is the notable example. Hamdi was born in the United
States while his father worked on an oil rig in Louisiana and thus enjoyed
birthright citizenship. But he left in infancy, never to return before his
apprehension in Afghanistan and detention at Guantanamo Bay. In no
respect other than formal citizenship status was Hamdi an “American.”
Indeed, it appears that he was ignorant of his citizenship until informed of it
by U.S. authorities.
In the last analysis, then, conceptions of citizenship supply imperfect
explanations for the rejection of terrorist expatriation proposals. The
flawed packaging of the Lieberman measure obscures the grounds for its
rejection, which was contingent and overdetermined. The lack of
instrumental value was probably the main driver, eliminating material
incentives to support the proposal as a counterterror tactic. In the absence
of such advantage, the expressive value of the measure could not outweigh
other reasons to resist, or ignore, the proposal.

TIMES, Jan. 27, 2010, (Magazine), at 26 (recounting the Alabama roots of Shabab leader
Omar Hammami).
93. See Nasser al-Awlaki, Op-Ed, The Drone That Killed My Grandson, N.Y. TIMES,
July 18, 2013, at A23 (describing al-Awlaki family ties to the United States).
94. Including my own. See, e.g., PETER J. SPIRO, BEYOND CITIZENSHIP (2008).
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CONCLUSION
I have two thoughts in closing. First, the coda to Hamdi suggests that the
existing expatriation regime has some continuing application in the
counterterror context. As part of the deal leading to his release and return
to Saudi Arabia in the wake of the Supreme Court’s ruling in his case,
Hamdi agreed to renounce his U.S. citizenship.95 The circumstances
regarding this component of the deal are opaque; it is not clear whether the
stipulation was forced on Hamdi as a condition of his release or whether he
freely agreed to it. The latter is possible, given the circumstances; Hamdi
showed no love for the United States, to which he had no organic
connection, and nothing about his treatment as a detainee would have
changed that. Where an alleged citizen terrorist is in custody, citizenship
itself can be put on the table in a way that might sort those who are
members of the community from those who are not. One wonders if
existing practice dispensed with the requirement to appear at a U.S.
consulate to deliver a notice of relinquishment whether the likes of alAwlaki and Gadahn might willingly, perhaps even with fanfare, undertake
the process.96 Individuals with a continuing American identity, such as
John Walker Lindh, would maintain their citizenship. To the extent that
allegiance is at issue, individuals might do the sorting.97
But the broader lesson is that citizenship is not much of a battleground
any longer, reflecting its declining salience. The expatriation proposal
proved little more than a political blip. The proposal was never fully
pressed and thus never required coordinated opposition. The measure
might not have been opposed by the public (no polls appear to have been
95. See Eric Lichtblau, U.S., Bowing to Court, To Free ‘Enemy Combatant,’ N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 23, 2004, at A1. For the release agreement in which Hamdi agreed to renounce
his U.S. citizenship, see Motion To Stay Proceedings, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, No. 2:02CV439
(E.D. Va. Sept. 24, 2004), available at http://notablecases.vaed.uscourts.gov/2:02-cv-00439/
docs/70223/0.pdf.
96. By statute, renunciation can only be undertaken before a consular official. See
Immigration and Nationality Act § 349, 8 U.S.C. § 1481 (2012). However, individuals can
also secure recognition of relinquishment of citizenship through the performance of an
expatriating act with intent to relinquish citizenship. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF
CONSULAR AFFAIRS, OMB NO. 1405-0178, DS-4079, REQUEST FOR DETERMINATION OF
POSSIBLE LOSS OF UNITED STATES CITIZENSHIP (2011). The Department of State appears to
have suggested that in the future, it may accept requests for recognition of relinquishment by
mail or through electronic submission. See 60-Day Notice of Proposed Information
Collection: Request for Determination of Possible Loss of United States Citizenship, 78
Fed. Reg. 39,823 (July 2, 2013). The relinquishment route is being rediscovered in the face
of increasingly burdensome tax requirements as imposed on U.S. citizens living outside the
United States. See Atossa Araxia Abrahamian, Special Report: Tax Time Pushes Some
Americans To Take a Hike, REUTERS (Apr. 16, 2012, 12:34 PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/16/us-usa-citizen-renounce-idUSBRE83F0UF20120
416. Securing loss of citizenship through relinquishment rather than renunciation avoids a
fee associated with renunciation and may have other advantages to individuals seeking to
shed their citizenship.
97. This would resemble the regime that existed before Afroyim and Terrazas. As noted
above, during World War II, many dual German and Japanese American citizens freely
chose to relinquish their U.S. citizenship by enlisting in a foreign armed service. See supra
note 16.
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conducted on the question, itself evidence that it proved a nonissue), but
neither did it garner a groundswell of support. One might imagine a
different response in an earlier time.

